Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2021
S. H. del Pin, Zuzanna Skóra, K. Sandberg et al.
Most research on consciousness tests only a single theory, and when theories are compared the comparisons are often verbal and non-systematic, which may contribute to the lack of convergence in the field. The authors argue that meaningful comparisons require evaluating whether predictions are parallel or contrasting, and they examine why direct comparisons are rare, suggesting the unique nature of consciousness itself as a possible explanation. They conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness and specify the features a theory of consciousness must account for.
July 26, 2020
M. Overgaard, J. Mogensen, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Identifying neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)—brain activity patterns that accompany conscious experience—raises deeper theoretical questions about what consciousness is. This volume examines the implications of NCC findings for major theories of consciousness, including global workspace theory, higher-order thought theory, local recurrency theory, and REFCON models. It also considers how different conscious phenomena, such as dreaming and altered states, shape the search for NCC. The work argues that mapping correlations between brain and consciousness does not end inquiry but instead prompts further philosophical and theoretical reflection on the nature of consciousness itself.
Frontiers in Psychology
October 30, 2014
K. Sandberg, L. M. Andersen, M. Overgaard
Moving beyond the traditional method of contrasting conscious and unconscious conditions can improve the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Existing paradigms that control for precursors and consequences of consciousness offer advantages but also have pitfalls. Multivariate decoding of neural activity patterns is proposed as a supplement because it can detect which patterns consistently predict conscious experiences on single trials. The NCC proper should be consistently predictive, whereas consequences of consciousness may not occur on every trial and prerequisites may be present without conscious experience, making both less predictive.
Brain and Cognition
February 1, 2004
M. Overgaard, J. Nielsen, A. Fuglsang-Frederiksen
Visual stimuli presented very briefly produce little or no subliminal perception in healthy individuals. When transcranial magnetic stimulation is applied, a dissociation emerges between correct performance and conscious awareness. The findings support the hypothesis that the ventral projection streams from area V1 are necessary for visual consciousness.