Most research on consciousness tests only a single theory, and when theories are compared the comparisons are often verbal and non-systematic, which may contribute to the lack of convergence in the field. The authors argue that meaningful comparisons require evaluating whether predictions are parallel or contrasting, and they examine why direct comparisons are rare, suggesting the unique nature of consciousness itself as a possible explanation. They conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness and specify the features a theory of consciousness must account for.
Moving beyond the traditional method of contrasting conscious and unconscious conditions can improve the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Existing paradigms that control for precursors and consequences of consciousness offer advantages but also have pitfalls. Multivariate decoding of neural activity patterns is proposed as a supplement because it can detect which patterns consistently predict conscious experiences on single trials. The NCC proper should be consistently predictive, whereas consequences of consciousness may not occur on every trial and prerequisites may be present without conscious experience, making both less predictive.