The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?
Irem Duman, Isabell Sophia Ehmann, Alicia Ronnie Gonsalves, Z. Gültekin, Jonathan van den Berckt, C. van Leeuwen
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience May 11, 2022 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.861517 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIn consciousness research, participants are typically asked to report what they consciously experience, but this may conflate the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with attention or metacognition. To avoid this, researchers have adopted no-report paradigms, which rely on comparing conditions with and without report. However, analysis of several such comparisons reveals alternative interpretations and methodological issues beyond the earlier criticism that merely removing report does not prevent metacognitive reflection. Without a task, the conscious mind tends to turn inward, switching between external stimuli and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, no-report paradigms may instead capture the neural correlates of conscious disengagement, reaffirming that they are no less problematic than report paradigms.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Medicine Psychology |
| Key finding | No-report paradigms may address the neural correlates of conscious disengagement rather than the neural correlates of consciousness, and are no less problematic than report paradigms. |
Abstract
In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.