A methodological dilemma for investigating consciousness empirically.

Finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC)—the minimal brain activity sufficient for a specific percept—faces a methodological dilemma. Conceptual decisions about how consciousness relates to attention, cognitive access, report, and other functions determine how correlation data are interpreted. Relying on subjective reports likely confounds the NCC with neural mechanisms for cognitive functions, because reports presuppose cognitive access. No-report paradigms risk confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. There appears to be no way to be sure that the neural correlate of conscious experience has been isolated.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper exposes a methodological dilemma arising for the research program of finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), the minimal set of brain processes sufficient for a particular percept. The main claim is that it is doubtful that the right kind of correlations will ever be obtained because the foregoing conceptual decisions regarding the relations between consciousness, attention, cognitive access, report, and other cognitive functions determine the interpretation of the correlation data that can be obtained. Relying on subjective reports likely leads to confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms for cognitive functions because reports presuppose cognitive access. No-report paradigms are in danger of confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. So there does not seem to be a way of making sure to have isolated the neural correlate of conscious experience.