An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms.

Cognitive theories of consciousness link frontoparietal circuits to conscious access, but no-report paradigms challenge this by showing conscious accessibility without prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. This paper presents a computational model based on active inference, treating working memory gating as a cognitive action. Simulating a visual masking task, the model shows that late P3b-like event-related potentials and increased PFC activity arise from the working memory demands of self-report generation. Removing reporting demands eliminates these late potentials and reduces PFC activity, reproducing no-report paradigm results. However, even without reporting, simulated PFC activity on visible trials still crosses the threshold for reportability, maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Thus, no-report paradigm evidence does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.