On the relationship between problems in the philosophy of mind and methodological fallacies

Philosophical problems about the mind—the mind-body problem, the unity of consciousness problem, and the binding problem—are closely interconnected and should not be treated in isolation. The author identifies two methodological obstacles in empirical consciousness research: the mereological fallacy and the fallacy of conflating levels of abstraction. These problems are classified by the types of relations they explain, divided into inter-type and intra-type, as well as vertical and horizontal relations. The unity of consciousness problem and the binding problem play a pivotal role in research on the mind-body problem, especially in the search for neural correlates of consciousness, with emphasis on vertical relations. Methodological errors underscore the relevance of this interconnectedness, which can impact hypothesis formulation and research directions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The paper examines the relationship between certain problems in the philosophy of mind. The discussion begins by identifying methodological obstacles in empirical consciousness research: the mereological fallacy and the fallacy of conflating levels of abstraction. Theoretical issues are addressed: the mind-body problem, the unity of consciousness problem, and the binding problem, situating them within a broader context and comparing them with one another. These problems are classified on the types of relations they explain, which are divided into inter-type and intra-type, as well as vertical and horizontal relations. By describing the relationships between these problems, the author demonstrates their close interconnectedness, which precludes treating them in isolation. The pivotal role of the unity of consciousness problem and the binding problem in research on the mind-body problem is highlighted, particularly in the context of the search for neural correlates of consciousness, with an emphasis on the importance of vertical relations. The relevance of this interconnectedness is underscored by the presence of methodological errors. In conclusion, it is argued that the question of the intersection of these problems can impact the formulation of hypotheses and the selection of research directions within the program of identifying neural correlates of consciousness.