Process Metaphysics of Consciousness

The hard problem of consciousness—explaining why there is subjective experience—rests on three questionable assumptions about how consciousness is constituted and how it causally relates to the world. By rethinking these phenomena as internally-structured processes, the problem ceases to be an insurmountable obstacle for a science of consciousness. This approach aligns with early 20th-century philosophical projects that preceded contemporary philosophy of mind. The authors translate metaphysical problems of consciousness into mereological language, focusing on part-whole relationships. Although the project is philosophical, it connects to quantum mechanics, systems theory, and embodied cognition.

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Abstract

In this article, we look at the hard problem of consciousness from the perspective of process metaphysics. We thereby identify three problematic premises of the problem that pertain to the constitution of consciousness and its causal relation to the world. We argue for the necessity of re-thinking the corresponding phenomena in terms of internally-structured processes. The hard problem would then cease to be an insurmountable obstacle to a science of consciousness. Furthermore, this line of reasoning is shown to be continuous with philosophical projects from the early 20th century that preceded the contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, we investigate the relationship of parts and wholes, and translate metaphysical problems of consciousness into mereological language. Despite this being a philosophical project, we frequently note and discuss links to the empirical sciences, in particular those of quantum mechanics, systems theory and the embodied cognition framework.