The Mind-Matter Dichotomy: A Persistent Challenge for Neuroscientific and Philosophical Theories.

The relationship between mind and matter and the nature of perception are examined from neurobiological and philosophical perspectives. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies are reviewed that connect neuronal processes to consciousness. The 'hard problem of consciousness'—explaining how subjective experience (qualia) arises from neuronal processes—can be alleviated if two conditions are met: perception depends on priors, and some priors are formed through interactions with immaterial realities of cultural concepts. This approach offers a coherent naturalistic explanation but does not resolve cognitive dissonance between intuitions and scientific evidence regarding matter and mind.

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Abstract

Several areas of cognitive neuroscience tackle traditional philosophical questions. Among the range of problems, two closely related issues will be addressed in more detail from both neurobiological and philosophical perspectives: the relationship between mind and matter and the nature of perception. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies are reviewed that examine the connection between neuronal processes and consciousness. The most prominent theories on the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) are then compared with philosophical attempts to address the epistemic gap between the material processes in the brain and mental phenomena. Before exploring whether neurobiological discoveries can help resolve philosophical problems, the epistemic challenges are discussed, stemming from the fact that perceptions are shaped by the brain's functional architecture. It is suggested that the 'hard problem of consciousness'-the challenge of explaining how the qualia of subjective experience can arise from neuronal processes-can be alleviated if two conditions are met: first, that perception depends on priors and, second, that some of these priors are formed through interactions with the immaterial realities of cultural concepts. Although this approach offers a coherent naturalistic explanation for the emergence of mental phenomena, it does not resolve the cognitive dissonance between our intuitions and scientific evidence regarding the relationship between matter and mind.