Lektorsky on dialectical materialism and enactivism

This article traces V.A. Lektorsky's evolving philosophical position on the debate between constructivism and realism, from his early dialectical materialism to a post-Marxist variant of realism. Lektorsky's later realism draws on cognitive science, rejecting the computational model of cognition in favor of enactivism, which emphasizes the knowing subject's physical body as actively embedded in and interacting with its environment. The analysis reconstructs two stages in Lektorsky's work on epistemological realism, examines the arguments for his conception of "constructive" or "activity" realism, and evaluates their merits within the broader European philosophical tradition.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The article analyses V.A. Lektorsky’s views on the debate on constructivism and realism. On the one hand, it considers the history of development of constructivism and realism as philosophical positions embedded in the evolution of European philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the changes in V.A. Lectorsky’s views on constructivism and realism are traced from dialectical materialism to post-Marxist variant of realism. The latter is built on the basis of analysis of cognitive science and recognition of limitations of the so-called computational model of cognition, as well as on the explication of epistemological consequences of enactivism, a concept emphasizing significance that the physical body of a knowing subject actively inscribed in the cognizing environment, i.e. interacting with it, has for cognitive processes. The article discusses the two distinguished stages in Lectorsky’s work on epistemological realism, reconstructs its genesis, discusses and evaluate the arguments that Lectorsky presents in support of his conception so-called “constructive” or “activity” realism.