Enactive Cognition and the Other: Enactivism and Levinas Meet Halfway

Enactivism defines cognition through a subject's natural interactions with the physical environment and, recently, through participatory sensemaking, where ethical know-how emerges from participation and communication. This paper argues that participatory sensemaking, while valuable, downplays the significance of otherness for ethics, as Levinas' work shows that we cannot fully anticipate others through participation or know-how; caring for a terminally ill person always falls short. However, enactivism and Levinas' philosophy share a concept of subjectivity as interacting with the external world to gain knowledge. Enactivism's participatory sensemaking also offers a concept of social justice based on equality and participation, which Levinas insufficiently defines.

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Abstract

This paper makes a comparison between enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy. Enactivism is a recent development in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that generally defines cognition in terms of a subject’s natural interactions with the physical environment. In recent years, enactivists have been focusing on social and ethical relations by introducing the concept of participatory sensemaking, according to which ethical know-how spontaneously emerges out of natural relations of participation and communication, that is, through the exchange of knowledge. This paper will argue first that, although participatory sensemaking is a valuable concept in that it offers a practical and realistic way of understanding ethics, it nevertheless downplays the significance of otherness for understanding ethics. I will argue that Levinas’ work demonstrates in turn that otherness is significant for ethics in that we cannot completely anticipate others through participation or know-how. We cannot live the other’s experiences or suffering, which makes ethical relation so difficult and serious (e.g. care for a terminally ill person always falls short to a certain extent). I will argue next that enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy nevertheless do not exclude each other insofar they share a similar concept of subjectivity as a quality of naturally interacting with the external world to gain knowledge (Levinas speaks of dwelling). Finally, I will argue that enactivism’s notion of participatory sensemaking also offers something which Levinas’ insufficiently defines, namely a concept of social justice, based on equality and participation, that emerges out of natural relations.