Against the Explanatory Argument for Enactivism

Sensorimotor enactivism claims that perceptual experience is shaped by implicit knowledge of how bodily movements alter sensory input. Proponents argue this view uniquely explains why specific material realizers produce particular experiences, closing the 'explanatory gap' that rival theories leave open. The author challenges this by showing the notion of 'material realizer' is ambiguous. Under a narrow interpretation, enactivism fails to bridge the gap; under a wide interpretation, it succeeds only to the same degree as established theories of consciousness. Therefore, enactivism offers no superior explanatory power over traditional accounts of conscious experience.

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Abstract

Sensorimotor enactivism is the view that the content and the sensory modality of perceptual experience are determined by implicit knowledge of lawful regularities between bodily movements and patterns of sensory stimulation. A proponent of the explanatory argument for sensorimotor enactivism holds that this view is able to provide an intelligible explanation for why certain material realizers give rise to certain perceptual experiences, while rival accounts cannot close this 'explanatory gap'. However, I argue that the notion of the 'material realizer' of perceptual experience is ambiguous. On a narrow construal, the explanatory gap cannot be bridged, not even by enactivism. On a wide construal, enactivism gets a grip on the explanatory gap, but only to the same extent as established theories of consciousness. Thus, on both horns of the dilemma, the explanatory power of enactivism is not superior to more traditional theories of conscious experience.