Cognitive Naturalism and the Phenomenal Feel

A commentary on Sandro Nannini's cognitive naturalism examines the analogy between the shift in the concept of time in relativity theory and a proposed shift toward a functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. The author argues that Nannini's naturalization procedure cannot account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states and highlights important differences between the conceptual change in physics and the intended change for consciousness. The commentary challenges the eliminative materialist view that we should abandon the folk psychological concept of consciousness, pointing to the explanatory gap that remains.

Study at a glance

Abstract

According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we should abandon our folk psychological concept of consciousness. In my commentary, I examine the naturalization procedure underlying Nannini’s cognitive naturalism, argue for its inability to account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states, and point to some important differences between the conceptual change in the case of time and the intended change in the case of consciousness.