Consciousness: Emergent and Real
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 28, 2015 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0047 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis paper presents three arguments against Nannini's eliminativist view that consciousness and the Self are illusions. First, the same premises Nannini uses for eliminativism can instead support naturalistic dualism, where phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from physical processes via psychophysical laws. Second, the paper challenges Nannini's claim that science's image should always override the manifest image, using a comparison between Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics to show scientific images can conflict. Third, identifying consciousness as an illusion fails to address the hard problem, because illusions themselves are phenomenal experiences requiring explanation.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Naturalistic dualism Emergentism Eliminativism |
| Key finding | Nannini's eliminativist arguments can be reinterpreted to support naturalistic dualism, his prioritization of scientific over manifest images is undermined by conflicting scientific interpretations, and calling consciousness an illusion does not explain phenomenal experience. |
Abstract
In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the world, eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity respectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained.