Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind.

The distinction between phenomenal consciousness (raw subjective experience) and access consciousness (information available for reasoning and reporting) is conceptually clear but empirically difficult to separate. Existing evidence has not resolved whether they can actually occur apart. A major methodological obstacle is that researchers typically rely on verbal reports, which already involve access consciousness. This paper proposes studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind, analogous to how water was identified before its chemical structure was known. By treating phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind with an underlying nature to be discovered, researchers can identify instances of it independently of access consciousness, just as non-liquid samples of water are still water. This framework provides a systematic way to move beyond the reliance on verbal report.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.