Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access.

In consciousness research, phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) is often distinguished from access consciousness (cognitive availability). Some scientists, notably Ned Block, argue that phenomenal content can exceed what is cognitively accessed—a claim known as 'overflow'. This review examines the evidence and concludes that existing data do not demonstrate overflow. Overflow is theoretically possible but extremely difficult to prove if 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' means information becoming 'cognitively available' in a broader sense, then a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible-yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate-under the condition that 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' is defined as information becoming 'cognitively available', in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.