Skip to content

Missing: Empirical theories of phenomenal consciousness.

J Kevin O'Regan

Cognitive neuroscience January 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838472 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

A critique argues that Doerig et al. assessed how empirical theories address access consciousness but overlooked their treatment of phenomenal consciousness, likely because most theories do not address phenomenal consciousness. The sensorimotor theory is an exception, yet Doerig et al. failed to evaluate it as a theory of phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Sensorimotor theory Access consciousness Phenomenal consciousness
Citations 1
Key finding Doerig et al. neglected to evaluate the sensorimotor theory as a theory of phenomenal consciousness, despite it being one of the few empirical theories that addresses it.

Abstract

Doerig et al. evaluate how current empirical theories approach access consciousness, but they neglect how they approach phenomenal consciousness - probably because most theories don't deal with phenomenal consciousness at all. One exception is the sensorimotor theory, but Doerig et al. did not evaluate it as being directed to phenomenal consciousness.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment