Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.
Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan P Lang, Andrew M Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Giulio Tononi
Neuroscience of consciousness January 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab032 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSubjective experience can be objectively explained in physical terms by moving beyond cognitive functions and understanding how experience is structured. Integrated information theory provides a framework to account for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do, avoiding the fallacy that only objective properties should be explained by science.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Contents of consciousness Functionalism Integrated information theory Space |
| Citations | 61 |
| Key finding | An objective science of the subjective is possible by using integrated information theory to explain, in physical terms, both the essential and specific properties of experience. |
Abstract
Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.