The myth of when and where: How false assumptions still haunt theories of consciousness.

The author argues that leading theories of consciousness fail to explain subjective experience because they rest on mistaken assumptions, creating a conflict between standard scientific methods and folk psychological notions. This cognitive dissonance blocks progress. Illusionism—the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion—is presented as the only viable framework for a scientific study of consciousness. Even if alternatives like panpsychism eventually prove correct, the author contends that the route to them must pass through Illusionism first.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Recent advances in neural sciences have uncovered countless facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of subjective experience as they are built on false assumptions. These assumptions have led us into a state of cognitive dissonance between maintaining our standard scientific practices on the one hand, and maintaining our folk notions on the other. I end by proposing Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness and that even if ideas like panpsychism turn out to be holding the seemingly missing piece of the puzzle, the path to them must go through Illusionism.