Trends in cognitive sciences
July 3, 2025
Andrew M. Haun, Giulio Tononi
5 citations
Visual experience is unfathomably rich, not sparse. Seeing involves three levels: high-level object and scene categorizations, mid-level feature groupings, and a fundamental spatial field of spots and their relations. Seeing objects requires seeing the groupings that compose them, and seeing groupings requires seeing the spatial field that grounds them. Even the basic feeling of spatial extendedness implies rich phenomenal structure. Much of what we see cannot be used, reported, or remembered, yet we see it.
PloS one
January 1, 2026
Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius ’t Hart, Belén M. Montabes De la Cruz et al.
The subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot is investigated to test three theories of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing Neurorepresentationalism (NREP). IIT predicts that the blind spot region, lacking feedforward input from one eye, should contribute differently to perceived spatial quality. The Predictive Processing accounts argue that internal models accommodate structural deviations based on sensory evidence. Participants evaluate distances, areas, and illusory motion with or without the blind spot involved. Psychometric models quantify bias and precision in perceived versus objective space. Simulated results correspond to each theory's predictions, and challenges for dissemination are discussed.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
April 7, 2020
Mohsen Afrasiabi, Michelle J. Redinbaugh, Jessica M. Phillips et al.
preprint
Simultaneous recordings from frontal, parietal, striatal, and thalamic regions in macaques during wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia, along with deep-brain thalamic stimulation, show that parietal cortex, striatum, and thalamus contribute more to the level of consciousness than frontal cortex. This supports Integrated Information Theory over Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Higher-order Theories, but Integrated Information Theory does not account for subcortical structures like the striatum. The authors propose that thalamo-striatal circuits have a cause-effect structure that generates integrated information.