PLoS ONE
December 4, 2025
Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al.
1 citation
Active inference, a framework for modeling how sentient agents behave, is being tested as necessary for changes in conscious content. In an adversarial collaboration, active inference will be contrasted with two other theories that do not require it for consciousness. This study protocol describes an adaptation of the motion-induced blindness paradigm: an active condition where participants direct their gaze toward a target after it disappears from consciousness and report its reappearance, versus a passive condition where participants fixate centrally while the stimulus array moves in a replay of active eye-tracking data. Two experiments will compare target reappearance across conditions to evaluate active inference's contribution to conscious awareness.
Consciousness and Cognition
June 14, 2026
Cyriel M. A. Pennartz, Micha Engeser
Conscious experiences are not accidental byproducts but serve a specific biological function: they provide a multimodal, situational survey of the brain's environment (including the body) that enables deliberate, planned behaviors. This argument is grounded in a neurorepresentationalist position that rejects the separation of phenomenal consciousness from its neural substrate, treating them as one functional entity. The function is illustrated by perceptual phenomena such as seeing the world upright, multisensory integration, and spatial object constancy. Pathological cases like Anton and Bonnet syndrome, where misrepresentation of reality severely impairs behavior, further support this view. The position is contrasted with other proposals, particularly those emphasizing a learning function of consciousness.
PloS one
January 1, 2026
Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius ’t Hart, Belén M. Montabes De la Cruz et al.
The subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot is investigated to test three theories of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing Neurorepresentationalism (NREP). IIT predicts that the blind spot region, lacking feedforward input from one eye, should contribute differently to perceived spatial quality. The Predictive Processing accounts argue that internal models accommodate structural deviations based on sensory evidence. Participants evaluate distances, areas, and illusory motion with or without the blind spot involved. Psychometric models quantify bias and precision in perceived versus objective space. Simulated results correspond to each theory's predictions, and challenges for dissemination are discussed.