Philosophies
July 16, 2019
Riccardo Manzotti
23 citations
Embodied cognition (EC) has offered artificial intelligence an alternative to traditional computationalism, splitting into weak and strong versions. The weak version borders on functionalism, while the strong version claims body–world interactions constitute cognition. However, the notion of constitution is ontologically problematic and offers no clear empirical or technical benefits. This paper examines ontological issues in both approaches—circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism—and proposes a more radical alternative called mind-object identity, briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and embodied identity theory.
Artificial intelligence in medicine
October 1, 2008
Riccardo Manzotti, Vincenzo Tagliasco
16 citations
Artificial consciousness remains a nascent field. This paper outlines theoretical assumptions that could help address phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being. It identifies technological and theoretical obstacles facing researchers and argues that artificial consciousness must confront how phenomenal consciousness arises in a physical world. The authors suggest that externalist models, which locate mental content partly outside the brain, currently offer the most promising path forward.
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2021
Riccardo Manzotti
1 citation
Consciousness can be located and bounded using a strictly physicalist approach. The paper identifies two unresolved issues in the extended cognition debate: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. It proposes using identity to isolate the physical basis of consciousness, introducing Mind-Object Identity (MOI) as a tentative solution and comparing it with other identity theories of mind.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2019
Riccardo Manzotti
A mind-object identity theory is proposed: one's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. The hypothesis is defended by redefining physical objects in terms of relative and actual properties. Cases of misperception like dreams and hallucinations are addressed by redefining the notion of present in relative terms. Both the object and the present are recast as object-relative.