Artificial consciousness: a discipline between technological and theoretical obstacles.
Riccardo Manzotti, Vincenzo Tagliasco
Artificial intelligence in medicine October 1, 2008 DOI: 10.1016/j.artmed.2008.07.002 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractArtificial consciousness remains a nascent field. This paper outlines theoretical assumptions that could help address phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being. It identifies technological and theoretical obstacles facing researchers and argues that artificial consciousness must confront how phenomenal consciousness arises in a physical world. The authors suggest that externalist models, which locate mental content partly outside the brain, currently offer the most promising path forward.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 16 |
| Key finding | Externalist models offer the most promising approach to addressing phenomenal consciousness in artificial consciousness. |
Abstract
Artificial consciousness is still far from being an established discipline. We will try to outline some theoretical assumption that could help in dealing with phenomenal consciousness. What are the technological and theoretical obstacles that face the enthusiast scholars of artificial consciousness? After presenting an outline of the state of artificial consciousness, we will focus on the relevance of phenomenal consciousness. Artificial consciousness needs to tackle the issue of phenomenal consciousness in a physical world. Up to now, the only models that give some hope of succeeding are the various kinds of externalism.