The perception of philosophical zombies—hypothetical beings indistinguishable from humans but lacking consciousness—may be shaped by linguistic biases rather than solid reasoning. In a study involving 200 participants, framing effects were observed: when presented with the term "zombie," 75% maintained strong intuitions about their conceivability, compared to just 40% for "duplicate." These results suggest that contextually defeated inferences can mislead understanding of consciousness, challenging the notion that significant barriers exist between physical processes and conscious experience.
Many philosophers and brain scientists consider explaining consciousness a major unsolved problem, with phenomenal consciousness seen as especially challenging. The belief that this phenomenon exists often relies on the claim that its existence is obvious in ordinary perceptual experience. This motivates studying people's intuitions about consciousness. Researchers in experimental philosophy have investigated how lay people understand and attribute mental states thought to be phenomenally conscious. This article discusses the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness and reviews work on whether non-experts possess this concept.
The authors previously argued that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities, which undermines a common justification for the hard problem of consciousness. Here, they respond to Talbot's criticism of their earlier argument, defending their position against the challenge.