6 papers in the library · 135 citations · publishing 2014-2024
AJOB Neurosci December 7, 2022 Joshua Shepherd 38 citations
Consciousness is often thought necessary for moral status, but this paper argues that this assumption is too uncertain to guide policy on non-human animals. Policies should consider that psychological traits independent of consciousness might be sufficient for moral status. The author illustrates practical consequences of questioning consciousness-based views.
AI & society January 1, 2024 Joshua Shepherd 34 citations
The paper argues that if valenced or affective experience is not essential for moral significance, as illustrated by hypothetical Vulcans who are conscious but lack affect, then one should be pressured to accept that consciousness itself may not be necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. It examines three positions: valence sentientism (valenced experience is necessary), broad sentientism (phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary), and non-necessitarianism (consciousness is unnecessary). The author contends that rejecting valence sentientism in light of Vulcans leads to accepting non-necessitarianism.
Philos Psychol October 3, 2014 Joshua Shepherd 33 citations
Folk views of free will and moral responsibility center on consciousness, not on whether actions align with an agent's long-standing values, motivations, or character traits. Experiments show that people consider conscious action production far more important for free will than concordance with the agent's deep self. When behaviorally identical agents differ only in consciousness, most participants attribute free will to conscious agents but not to nonconscious ones. These findings challenge leading philosophical theories—Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views—to develop a substantive account of the connection between consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility that takes ordinary intuitions seriously.
J Philos August 1, 2017 Joshua Shepherd 26 citations
The experience of acting integrates agentive aspects—those tied to carrying out intentions—with perceptual aspects linked to observable actions in the world. Acting is both an engagement with and intimate acquaintance with the world; in conscious action, an agent consciously intervenes in and experiences the changing world. The author critiques existing accounts of this experience, then develops a new account using Casey O’Callaghan's work on multi-modal perception, and concludes by discussing implications for psychology and philosophy.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Joshua Shepherd, Neil Levy 4 citations
Consciousness is relevant to three distinct ethical issues: an entity's moral status, moral responsibility for actions, and the acquisition of moral knowledge. Despite these different connections, it remains unclear what exactly about consciousness makes it intuitively important for each area. The chapter explores whether there might be a common thread linking these issues, concluding that this possibility remains open.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Myrto Mylopoulos, Joshua Shepherd
This chapter examines the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—the experiences associated with intentional actions. It reviews pioneering work from the early 1980s in psychology and neuroscience that motivates much current research. The discussion covers the scope of these experiences, their relationship to other types of experiences, how best to characterize different aspects, and the function of various agentive experiences.