Nature Communications
September 25, 2020
Peter Lush, Vanessa Botan, R. B. Y. Scott et al.
136 citations
Hypnotisability—a normally distributed, stable trait—predicts experiential changes like hallucinations in response to imaginative suggestion, which feel involuntary. Such experiences can also be triggered by implicit suggestion outside hypnosis. In three large samples (156, 404, and 353 participants), substantial relationships were found between hypnotisability and experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion, comparable to relationships with individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies from perceived task requirements may explain experiential change in psychological experiments.
Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice
June 25, 2020
Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, Bence Pálfi et al.
42 citations
Hypnotizability reflects a broader trait called phenomenological control, which allows people to create subjective experiences in nonhypnotic contexts to fulfill goals. This control operates as a metacognitive process where intentional actions occur without awareness of specific intentions, known as cold control. Laboratory phenomena such as vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion may partly result from phenomenological control. A new theory of intentional binding measures the absence of conscious intentions in hypnosis. No evidence suggests cold control confers abilities beyond changes in metacognitive monitoring, and a negative correlation exists between mindfulness and cold control, viewed as a lack of awareness of intentions.
Collabra Psychology
January 1, 2021
Peter Lush, R. B. Y. Scott, Anil K. Seth et al.
35 citations
Phenomenological control—the ability to generate experiences to match expectancies—varies as a stable trait and can be measured through responses to imaginative suggestions such as paralysis, amnesia, or hallucinations. While traditionally studied within hypnosis, the context of hypnosis itself may distort scores due to misconceptions. The Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS), adapted from the Sussex Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability but without hypnotic framing, yields higher mean scores and similar reliability on its subjective scale. The PCS is thus a valid tool for assessing trait phenomenological control outside the hypnotic context, suitable for broader psychological experiments.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
July 22, 2025
François Stockart, Maor Schreiber, Pietro Amerio et al.
20 citations
The scope of unconscious processing remains hotly debated, driven by diverse methods for manipulating and measuring perceptual awareness. Through dialogue among researchers with varied theoretical backgrounds, ten recommendations and nine outstanding issues are provided for designing experimental paradigms, analyzing data, and reporting results. These guidelines aim to evoke discussion about norms in studying unconscious processes and help researchers make informed decisions. While some recommendations may not align with existing approaches and will likely evolve, they are intended to foster a more convergent understanding of the extent and limits of unconscious processing.
February 27, 2026
Kevin Sheldrake, Zoltan Dienes
preprint
Hypnosis is one manifestation of a broader human capacity called phenomenological control: an evolved ability to deceive oneself to support socially useful beliefs. This capacity allows people to strategically construct subjective experiences that misrepresent reality despite contradictory evidence, in order to meet goals. It is so effective that researchers studying it have often been deceived, mistaking participants' constructed experiences—such as feeling energies or special states—for the mechanism itself. Phenomenological control is used in spirit possession, spiritual experiences, esoteric martial arts, everyday life, and psychology experiments.
Consciousness and cognition
March 1, 2003
Josef Perner, Zoltan Dienes
Children likely become consciously aware of events in the world between 12 and 15 months of age, with a possible range of plus or minus 3 months. This conclusion emerges from evaluating five strategies: three look for signs of verbal communication, executive control, or explicit memory—activities that require conscious awareness in adults; two consider when children can engage in the minimal higher-order thought needed for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. The answer is tentative, based on converging evidence from these different approaches.