Phenomenological control as cold control.
Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, Bence Pálfi, Warrick Roseboom, R. B. Y. Scott, Benjamin A. Parris, Anil K. Seth, Max Lovell
Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice June 25, 2020 DOI: 10.1037/cns0000230 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractHypnotizability reflects a broader trait called phenomenological control, which allows people to create subjective experiences in nonhypnotic contexts to fulfill goals. This control operates as a metacognitive process where intentional actions occur without awareness of specific intentions, known as cold control. Laboratory phenomena such as vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion may partly result from phenomenological control. A new theory of intentional binding measures the absence of conscious intentions in hypnosis. No evidence suggests cold control confers abilities beyond changes in metacognitive monitoring, and a negative correlation exists between mindfulness and cold control, viewed as a lack of awareness of intentions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Meditation |
| Keywords | Cognitive psychology Control management Context archaeology Hypnosis |
| Citations | 42 |
| Key finding | Hypnotizability is part of a general trait of phenomenological control, which operates via cold control—a metacognitive process where intentional actions occur without awareness of specific intentions—and this control may underlie phenomena like vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion. |
Abstract
We first review recent work from our laboratory, which construes hypnotizability as an example of a more general trait of capacity for phenomenological control, which people can use to create subjective experiences in many nonhypnotic contexts where those experiences fulfill people's goals. Second, we review recent work, which construes phenomenological control as a specifically metacognitive process, where intentional cognitive and motor action occurs without awareness of specific intentions (cold control theory). In terms of the reach of phenomenological control, we argue that various laboratory phenomena, namely vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion are to an unknown degree a construction of phenomenological control. The argument can of course be extended in principle to other findings. In terms of the reach of cold control, we present a new theory of intentional binding and show how intentional binding can measure the absence of conscious intentions in the hypnotic context. We obtain no evidence that cold control confers abilities beyond the changes in the metacognitive monitoring it postulates, and we explore the negative correlation between mindfulness and cold control viewed as a lack of mindfulness of intentions.