Reason, Rhythm, and Rituality. Reinterpreting Religious Cult from a Postmodern, Phenomenological Perspective
Religions July 10, 2015 DOI: 10.3390/rel6030819 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractContemporary philosophy of religion tends to treat religious doctrines and organized religion's social impact as worthy of analysis while dismissing cultic practices—prayer, religious service, ascetic rituals—as irrational and incomprehensible. This paper traces the historical roots of that devaluation to Kant's philosophy of religion, which created a sharp dichotomy between humans as moral subjects and as natural, sensible beings. The authors argue that Habermas's paradoxical views on religion stem from this Kantian dilemma. They then offer a phenomenological alternative: religious practice should be understood not as primitive or irrational but as a proto-ethical schematism that integrates pure practical reason into the rhythmic structure of living, embodied consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Philosophy of religion Postmodern philosophy Religious rituals Ethics |
| Key finding | Religious rituals should be interpreted as a proto-ethical schematism that integrates pure practical reason into embodied consciousness, not as irrational phenomena. |
Abstract
Contemporary philosophy of religion is often focused, at a theoretical level, on the epistemic value of religious doctrines, and at a practical level, on the possible impact of organized religion on secular society and politics. However, the cultic dimension of religion, such as prayer, religious service, ascetic practices, and other rituals, is considered as completely “irrational” and incomprehensible from a secular perspective and therefore often neglected by postmodern philosophy. The paper intends to call into question this rather simplistic interpretation by retracing the historical origins of the devaluation of religious symbolism in occidental thought, which culminates in Kant’s philosophy of religion. We then shall analyze to what extent certain paradoxical aspects of Habermas’ view on religion can be interpreted as consequences of the dilemma brought about by the Kantian dichotomy between man as moral subject and man as natural, sensible being. In a third step, we shall develop an alternative, phenomenological interpretation, which does not consider religious practice as a primitive, irrational phenomenon but as a proto-ethical schematism that aims at integrating the sphere of pure practical reason into the rhythmic structure of living, embodied consciousness.