Afro-Brazilian Religions and the Prospects for a Philosophy of Religious Practice

The philosophy of religion has neglected practices central to traditions like Afro-Brazilian Candomblé and Umbanda—offering, sacrifice, spirit possession, and mediumship—because philosophers rely on text-based, belief-focused, institutionalized religions. Anthropologists have studied these orally transmitted traditions for nearly a century, yet philosophers lack a methodology for such practices. The authors argue this neglect is not accidental but stems from a restricted diet of examples and inattention to ethnography. They critique Kevin Schilbrack’s proposed embodiment paradigm, conceptual metaphor theory, and extended mind thesis, finding his view of language as linear, his problematic conception of the body, and his misleading account of cognitive levels inadequate. Instead, they conclude that the philosophy of religion should adopt enactivism to treat religious practices as cognitive enterprises.

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Abstract

In this paper, we take our cue from Kevin Schilbrack’s admonishment that the philosophy of religion needs to take religious practices seriously as an object of investigation. We do so by offering Afro-Brazilian traditions as an example of the methodological poverty of current philosophical engagement with religions that are not text-based, belief-focused, and institutionalized. Anthropologists have studied these primarily orally transmitted traditions for nearly a century. Still, they involve practices, such as offering and sacrifice as well as spirit possession and mediumship, that have yet to receive attention from philosophers. We argue that this is not an accident: philosophers have had a highly restricted diet of examples, have not looked at ethnography as source material, and thus still need to put together a methodology to tackle such practices. After elucidating Schilbrack’s suggestions to adopt an embodiment paradigm and apply conceptual metaphor theory and the extended mind thesis to consider religious practices as thoughtful, we offer criticism of the specifics of his threefold solution. First, it assumes language is linear; second, it takes a problematic view of the body; and third, it abides by a misleading view of the “levels” of cognition. We conclude that the philosophy of religion should adopt enactivism to understand religious practices as cognitive enterprises.