Explaining the “hard” problem

Global-workspace theory can provide a complete, reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. By globally broadcasting nonconceptual content, the theory enables higher-order thoughts about that content that lack conceptual connections to physical, functional, or representational facts. This makes zombies conceivable and creates an epistemic explanatory gap. However, those higher-order thoughts themselves can be fully explained naturalistically, so all facts about consciousness can be accounted for. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed for this account and responds to a dilemma posed by David Chalmers.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable and an (epistemic) explanatory gap is opened up. But the thoughts in question can themselves be given a fully naturalistic explanation. Hence all of the facts involved in consciousness can be fully explained. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed to make this account work, and replies to a dilemma for the account proposed by David Chalmers.