The Hard Problem of Consciousness
Schriften zu Leben und Gesellschaft - Series on Life and Society January 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-03927-9_11
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe chapter examines David Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" and the ontological puzzles of the mind-body problem. It argues that Chalmers' goal of developing a naturalist theory of mind and matter may be more achievable than he himself suggests, provided certain questions are approached from a different perspective.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Chalmers' objective to find a naturalist theory of mind and matter might not be as impossible as estimated by Chalmers himself, if questions are asked from a different perspective. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter refers to the “hard problem of consciousness”, as discussed by David Chalmers, and its peculiar difficulties. Following Chalmers’s decade long work on the ontological riddles posed by the mind-body-problem, the chapter concludes Chalmers’s objective to find a naturalist theory of mind and matter might not be as impossible as estimated by Chalmers himself—at least not if we are prepared to ask some questions in from a different perspective.