An Embodied Cognition Perspective on the Role of Interoception in the Development of the Minimal Self

Interoception—the sense of the internal state of the body—is a key but often overlooked component of the human minimal self, the basic sense of being a distinct, embodied subject. This perspective article extends the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain how the minimal self develops. The authors review existing theories linking interoception and the minimal self, then propose that motor and interoceptive states have a bidirectional relationship that jointly shapes the minimal self. They present empirical findings on interoception in development and offer theoretical predictions for future experiments, aiming to provide a comprehensive view of the mechanisms underlying the minimal self.

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Abstract

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self