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Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain

Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences October 11, 2016 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Interoception—the perception of internal bodily states—is being reconceptualized through the lens of hierarchical inference in the brain. Bodily states are regulated by autonomic reflexes enslaved by descending predictions from deep generative models of our internal and external environment. This re-conceptualization, termed interoceptive inference, illuminates issues in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, including experiences of selfhood and emotion. The review contextualizes interoception in active Bayesian inference, highlighting its enactivist aspects, the role of uncertainty or precision in neuromodulation, implications for the functional anatomy of the emotional brain, and the role of interoception in shaping a sense of embodied self and feelings. Links are drawn between homeostasis, allostasis, cybernetic predictive control, and predictive processing. The explanatory scope ranges from autism and depression to consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Keywords Interoception Embodied cognition Cognitive science Inference Cognitive psychology
Citations 936
Key finding Interoceptive inference reconceptualizes bodily state regulation as driven by descending predictions from generative models, with implications for selfhood, emotion, and clinical conditions like autism and depression.

Abstract

We review a recent shift in conceptions of interoception and its relationship to hierarchical inference in the brain. The notion of interoceptive inference means that bodily states are regulated by autonomic reflexes that are enslaved by descending predictions from deep generative models of our internal and external milieu. This re-conceptualization illuminates several issues in cognitive and clinical neuroscience with implications for experiences of selfhood and emotion. We first contextualize interoception in terms of active (Bayesian) inference in the brain, highlighting its enactivist (embodied) aspects. We then consider the key role of uncertainty or precision and how this might translate into neuromodulation. We next examine the implications for understanding the functional anatomy of the emotional brain, surveying recent observations on agranular cortex. Finally, we turn to theoretical issues, namely, the role of interoception in shaping a sense of embodied self and feelings. We will draw links between physiological homoeostasis and allostasis, early cybernetic ideas of predictive control and hierarchical generative models in predictive processing. The explanatory scope of interoceptive inference ranges from explanations for autism and depression, through to consciousness. We offer a brief survey of these exciting developments.This article is part of the themed issue 'Interoception beyond homeostasis: affect, cognition and mental health'.

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