Intercorporeality and the Problem of Other Minds

The recognition of others as conscious individuals with subjective experience is rooted in a pre-reflective, bodily form of intersubjectivity, not in abstract reasoning. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's concept of intercorporeality, the body plays a dual role: at a basic level, perceiving others' actions triggers bodily simulation that generates an embodied understanding; at a second level, the body contributes to meaning-making through embodied metaphors in language. The case of schizophrenia clarifies this twofold role, showing that disturbances in bodily self-experience can undermine the very conditions for recognizing others as epistemic agents. This reframing carries epistemological implications for the problem of other minds.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper develops an embodied account of the problem of other minds. I argue that our capacity to recognize others, and to be recognized by them, as individuals capable of subjective experience and knowledge, is rooted in a pre-reflective intersubjectivity, articulated through Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality. On this view, the body plays a twofold role. At a basic level, social understanding arises through bodily attunement: in perceiving others’actions, our bodies simulate their experiences, thereby generating a corporeal mode of understanding. At a second level, the body contributes to the construction of meaning, as suggested by data on the embodiment of language and, specifically, on the embodiment of metaphors. This twofold role of the body is clarified through the case of schizophrenia. Reframing the problem of other minds in embodied terms carries epistemological implications. If the recognition of others as epistemic agents is rooted in bodily self-experience, disturbances of embodiment undermine the very conditions of epistemic relatedness.