Social enactivism about perception—reply to McGann

The author responds to a comment by McGann, who claimed that a previous article overlooked a group of enactivist theories called participatory sense-making. The author explains the omission because those theories are not accounts of perception. Unlike participatory sense-making, the original article focuses not on the perceptual aspects of social things, but on the social aspects that constitute perception in general. The reply concludes by underscoring the central argument: that the appropriate concept to make enactivism about perception social is that of "perceptual practices," a notion of perception based on social practices.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.