Mirror Neurons, Husserl, and Enactivism: An Analysis of Phenomenological Compatibility

Mirror neuron research has been widely discussed for explaining social cognition, but this article argues it conflicts with phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, particularly those of Dan Zahavi. The enactivist perspectives of Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher offer an alternative description of intersubjectivity that resolves these incompatibilities. The article assesses whether the enactivist account is more phenomenologically consistent than mirror neuron research alone, concluding that it overcomes Zahavi's objections. It recommends that Fuchs and De Jaegher acknowledge their debt to Husserlian descriptions of empathy and that mirror neuron research be placed within a broader, phenomenologically compatible framework.

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Abstract

AbstractThe potential for mirror neuron research to explain various aspects of social cognition has received considerable attention over the past two decades. Initially, mirror neuron research may seem in accordance with a phenomenological understanding of intersubjectivity, but the work of Dan Zahavi will be used to highlight significant incompatibilities between the two. Likewise, the enactivists Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher identify significant issues with current interpretations of mirror neuron research and provide an alternative description of intersubjectivity. This article will assess whether the enactivists are able to provide a more phenomenologically consistent alternative to mirror neuron research alone, eventually determining that their enactive account overcomes Zahavi’s incompatibilities. Consequently, Fuchs and De Jaegher should acknowledge their relation to Husserlian descriptions of empathy in their account, and mirror neuron research should be contextualised within a broader, phenomenologically-compatible framework, as that of the enactivists.