Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity

Enactivists argue that genuine intersubjectivity is possible: people can directly participate in each other's experience. Theory of mind approaches to social cognition have improved by incorporating neuroscience and phenomenology, but they still rely on two flawed assumptions: a cognitive unconscious that explains social understanding through subpersonal representational mechanisms, and methodological individualism that limits explanations to processes inside the individual. The enactive approach overcomes these constraints by integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics within and between subjects, supported by formal and empirical research on social interaction.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract Enactivists are searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity. Theory of mind approaches to social cognition have come a long way from folk psychological theorizing by paying more attention to neuroscientific evidence and phenomenological insights. This has led to hybrid accounts that incorporate automatic processing and allow an instrumental role for perception and interaction. However, two foundational assumptions remain unquestioned. First, the cognitive unconscious: explanations assume there is a privileged domain of subpersonal mechanisms that operate in terms of representational personal-level concepts (belief, desire, inference, pretense, etc.), albeit unconsciously. Second, methodological individualism: explanations of social capacities are limited to mechanisms contained within the individual. The enactive approach breaks free from these representationalist-internalist constraints by integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics occurring within and between subjects. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.