Embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition.
Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors, Harold Bekkering
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2010 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues that criticisms of embodied cognition—such as whether sensorimotor brain activation is necessary for language comprehension and how we understand language for which we lack relevant experiences—stem from interpreting embodiment through a cognitivist lens. Instead, the authors propose an enactivist, non-representationalist model: language comprehension is procedural knowledge (knowing how, not knowing that) that enables interaction with others in a shared physical world. On this view, activation in modality-specific brain areas reflects the use of sensorimotor skills, and comprehension is context-bound. The enactivist approach thus supports an embodied view of language while avoiding the problems faced by cognitivist interpretations.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Enactivism Language comprehension Simulation |
| Citations | 46 |
| Key finding | An enactivist model of language comprehension, treating it as procedural knowledge, resolves criticisms of embodied cognition by avoiding cognitivist assumptions. |
Abstract
Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the "necessity question" (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the "simulation constraint" (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge - knowledge how, not knowledge that - that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment.