Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?

Thinking has its own distinctive feel that cannot be reduced to sensory experiences. Drawing on Husserl's theory of intentionality from the Logical Investigations, the author argues that at least some thinking mental states possess a specific phenomenality. The case of understanding is presented as a paradigmatic example using the phenomenal contrast argument, and this argument is defended against two objections.

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.