Consciousness and Intentionality

Mental states have two main features: intentionality (being about something) and phenomenal consciousness (the felt, experiential aspect). For decades these were thought to be separate and independent, but recent philosophy challenges that. This chapter surveys views on their relationship and endorses the phenomenal intentionality theory, which holds that the most basic kind of intentionality originates from phenomenal consciousness.

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Abstract

Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or ‘what it’s like’ aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This chapter overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.