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Untying the World-Knot: Active Inference and the Pattern Theory of the Will in Schopenhauer

Gerd Leidig

Preprints.org March 16, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.20944/preprints202603.1115.v1 via OpenAlex

Summary

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Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, when stripped of its ontological commitments, offers rich descriptions of embodied agency and selfhood that align with contemporary cognitive science. This paper reconstructs Schopenhauer's ideas in four stages: interpreting his unity of body and will through the Free Energy Principle; situating his fragmented self within Gallagher's Pattern Theory of Self; framing his ethics of compassion as a precursor to a Pattern Theory of Compassion; and explaining his pessimism as predictive dysregulation. The approach uses cognitive models as a functional grammar for phenomenal experience without reducing its metaphysical depth.

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Metaphysics Embodied cognition Pessimism Inference Situated
Key finding Schopenhauer's philosophy, naturalized through cognitive science frameworks, provides a viable account of embodied agency, selfhood, compassion, and pessimism.

Abstract

Contemporary philosophy of mind is beginning to rehabilitate Arthur Schopenhauer as a proto-phenomenologist whose metaphysics of the will—once divested of its ontological commitments—provides thick descriptions of embodied agency, self-structure, and intersubjective resonance. This article validates this thesis through a four-stage naturalized reconstruction: (1) Schopenhauer’s "world-knot" and the unity of body and will are interpreted as phenomenal facets of minimal self-models within the framework of the Free Energy Principle (Friston, 2010). (2) His fragmented theory of the self is situated within Gallagher’s Pattern Theory of Self (2013). (3) His ethics of compassion is framed as a precursor to a Pattern Theory of Compassion. (4) Finally, affective criticality is employed to explain Schopenhauer's diagnosis of pessimism as a form of predictive dysregulation. Methodologically, the paper circumvents the pitfall of superficial analogies by adopting a weak methodological naturalism, utilizing cognitive models as a functional grammar for phenomenal material without reductively truncating the metaphysical deep structure.

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