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Unsnarling the world-knot: consciousness, freedom, and the mind-body problem

Choice Reviews Online July 1, 1998 DOI: 10.5860/choice.35-6165 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The mind-body problem, known as the 'world-knot', has puzzled philosophers since Descartes. David Ray Griffin argues that both dualism and materialism fail because they retain the Cartesian view of matter. He proposes a third realist approach: pan-experientialist physicalism, grounded in Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy. This view treats experience and spontaneity as fully natural, offering a naturalistic account of how consciousness emerges while preserving the freedom we assume in everyday life. Griffin engages with philosophers such as Dennett, Kim, and Searle to show that materialist physicalism is more problematic than dualism, and he defends pan-experientialism against charges of absurdity.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Knot papermaking Mind–body problem Aesthetics Philosophy
Citations 103
Key finding Pan-experientialist physicalism, grounded in process philosophy, provides a naturalistic account of consciousness that resolves the mind-body problem by treating experience and spontaneity as fully natural.

Abstract

The mind-body problem, which Schopenhauer called the 'world-knot', has been a central problem for philosophy since the time of Descartes. Among realists - those who accept the reality of the physical world - the two dominant approaches have been dualism and materialism, but there is a growing consensus that, if we are ever to understand how mind and body are related, a radically new approach is required. David Ray Griffin develops a third form of realism, one that resolves the basic problem (common to dualism and materialism) of the continued acceptance of the Cartesian view of matter.In dialogue with various philosophers, including Dennett, Kim, McGinn, Nagel, Seager, Searle, and Strawson, Griffin shows that materialist physicalism is even more problematic than dualism. He proposes instead a pan-experientialist physicalism grounded in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Answering those who have rejected 'pan-psychism' as obviously absurd, Griffin argues compellingly that pan-experientialism, by taking experience and spontaneity as fully natural, can finally provide a naturalistic account of the emergence of consciousness - an account that also does justice to the freedom that we all presuppose in practice.

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