Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology

The enactive theory of color holds that color is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but arises from the co-constitution of perceiver and perceived in the process of experience. This view parallels Husserl's phenomenology, which also rejects a strict subject-object duality. The paper argues that enactive color relationism offers a better alternative to both color subjectivism and objectivism. It extends this account to sensory qualities (qualia) more broadly, outlining an enactive phenomenology and ontology that situate qualities within the dynamic interaction between organism and world.

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Abstract

In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.