Enactive Aesthetics and Neuroaesthetics

Enactive approaches to art argue that aesthetic experience is non-contentful, artifact-including, and embodied, and they often dismiss empirical (neuro)aesthetics as unable to capture this engagement. This paper reviews radical enactivism, Gallagher's embodied-enactive account of art affordances, and Noë's view of art as reorganizational practice. While agreeing with the relational and enactive nature of mind, the author contends that dismissing empirical aesthetics is misguided: the criticism is either too general about methods or based on philosophical claims open to empirical testing. Relevant empirical research exists that enactive theorists should consider.

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Abstract

In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noë (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of these accounts claims that empirical (neuro)aesthetics is incapable of capturing the art-related engagement they want to highlight. While I agree on the relational and enactive nature of the mind and see the presented theories as important contributions to our understanding of art and aesthetics, I will argue that their dismissal of empirical aesthetics is misguided on several counts. A more qualified look can reveal relevant empirical research for claims enactive theorists should be interested in. Their criticism is either too general regarding the empirical methods employed or based on philosophical claims that themselves can be subjected to empirical scrutiny.