Sidestepping the semantics of "consciousness".
The Behavioral and brain sciences April 1, 2004 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0421007x via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe author critiques Block's claim that the term "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, arguing that the nature of ambiguity itself is unclear and that the conflation of these two concepts can be explained without assuming ambiguity. By avoiding controversial semantic issues, Block's argument could be strengthened.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The conflation of phenomenal and access consciousness can be explained without assuming that the term "consciousness" is ambiguous. |
Abstract
Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term "consciousness." However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of "consciousness."