Quining diet qualia.

The paper argues that the concept of 'diet qualia'—a watered-down version of classic qualia that strips away their intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective properties—has no distinctive content. Classic qualia are traditionally understood as intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective features of experience. The author contends that once these properties are removed, nothing phenomenal remains to be explained. Therefore, if one rejects classic qualia realism, the only thing left to explain is our disposition to judge that experiences have classic qualia—what the author calls 'zero' qualia. The paper concludes that diet qualia should be abandoned, following Dennett's suggestion to 'quine' them.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The 'classic' conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down 'diet' conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia realism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are 'zero' qualia - our dispositions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett's phrase, be quined.