Sensing Qualia.
Frontiers in systems neuroscience January 1, 2022 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractExplaining qualia—the subjective contents of conscious experience—within a naturalistic framework is challenging. Examining Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory reveals each fails to adequately account for qualia. To overcome this, the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, is proposed that preserves multiple realizability while providing a scientifically grounded approach to explaining qualia in the natural world.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Behaviorism Consciousness Grounded functionalism Identity theory Integrated information theory |
| Citations | 9 |
| Key finding | Grounded Functionalism, which interprets the senses as physical detectors, offers a scientifically based approach to accounting for qualia while retaining multiple realizability. |
Abstract
Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind-Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory-will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.