Experiential Presence and the Problem of Selfhood: A Candidate Invariant of Consciousness?

Conscious experience may have a more fundamental and persistent feature than the forms of selfhood usually associated with it. Drawing on reports from dreaming, contemplative practice, psychedelic states, and nondual awareness, the paper introduces the concept of experiential presence: the minimal fact that experience appears present at all. This is a heuristic construct, not a metaphysical entity. Autobiographical identity, agency, embodiment, and self-boundary can transform while conscious experience remains. The paper considers competing interpretations and raises methodological and epistemological issues about whether experiential presence may be part of the condition under which consciousness becomes available for investigation. It does not claim experiential presence is universal, but aims to clarify questions for future research.

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Abstract

This paper explores the possibility that conscious experience may possess a more fundamental and persistent feature than many forms of selfhood ordinarily associated with consciousness. Drawing upon reports from dreaming, contemplative practice, psychedelic states, nondual awareness, and other altered conditions, the paper examines a recurring observation: autobiographical identity, agency, embodiment, self-boundary, and subject-object organization may undergo substantial transformation while conscious experience itself appears to remain present. To investigate this possibility, the paper introduces the provisional concept of experiential presence, defined descriptively as the minimal fact that experience appears present at all. Experiential presence is not proposed as a metaphysical entity or explanatory mechanism, but as a heuristic construct for examining whether a candidate invariant may persist across diverse conscious conditions. Several competing interpretations are considered, including retrospective reconstruction, stable neural organization, higher-order organizational invariance, and phenomenological necessity. The paper also explores the relationship between experiential presence and existing concepts such as minimal selfhood, pre-reflective self-awareness, and minimal phenomenal experience. Beyond questions of phenomenology, the analysis raises methodological and epistemological issues concerning whether experiential presence may function not only as a feature of consciousness but also as part of the condition under which consciousness becomes available for investigation. The paper advances no claim that experiential presence has been established as universal or necessary. Instead, it aims to clarify a set of interconnected questions concerning consciousness, selfhood, invariance, and self-knowledge, and to identify directions for future empirical and theoretical research.