Bare Awareness and Procedural Insight: A Naturalized Account of Minimal -Dual Experience

Experiences of 'pure' or non-dual awareness, often celebrated as glimpses of ultimate reality, are better understood as contingent phenomena shaped by trained skills and bodily-attentional dynamics rather than as ineffable metaphysical revelations. Drawing on epistemology, phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and contemplative studies, the paper argues these introspective insights constitute procedural knowledge—accessible only through practiced psychophysiological methods—not propositional truths. The authors replace absolutist terms like 'non-dual' with pragmatic labels such as Bare Existence and Bare Awareness, emphasizing grounded, naturalistic origins. They outline how such experiences emerge from specific attentional and bodily conditions, why they resist conventional explanation, and how first-person methods can integrate with third-person neuroscience. The framework demystifies profound contemplative states, making them legitimate for scientific and philosophical inquiry without invoking mysticism.

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Abstract

Contemplative traditions often celebrate experiences of “pure” or non-dual awareness as insights into an ultimate reality beyond conceptual grasp. This paper offers a grounded alternative: such Bare Awareness or minimal-dual experiences are best understood not as ineffable metaphysical revelations, but as contingent phenomena constrained by procedural access (skills and practices) and bodily–attentional dynamics. Drawing on epistemology, phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and contemplative studies, we argue that these introspective insights are a form of procedural knowledge—accessible only through trained psychophysiological practices—rather than propositional truths expressible in language. We replace absolutist terminology (e.g. “non-dual,” “pure consciousness”) with pragmatic terms like Bare Existence, Present-Constrained Experience, and Bare Awareness to emphasize the grounded nature of these states. After outlining the phenomenology of Bare Awareness and its emergence via specific attentional and bodily conditions, we discuss why such insights resist conventional explanation (the transparency of experience and minimal subject–object structure) and examine the limits of propositional description. Objections concerning subjectivism or anti-scientific bias are addressed by demonstrating how first-person methods can be rigorously integrated with third-person neuroscience. The result is a framework for integrating phenomenology and cognitive science in contemplative research, treating introspection as a trainable skill that can illuminate consciousness without invoking mysticism. By demystifying profound contemplative experiences, we aim to make them a legitimate subject of philosophical and scientific inquiry, showing that one can be awed by “Bare Awareness” while remaining firmly within a naturalistic, evidence-based perspective.