Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense
Philosophy East and West January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2018.0075 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIn early Buddhist Ābhidharmika thought, non-conceptual cognition was understood as the direct apprehension of objects by the five sense consciousnesses—for example, seeing blue without the conceptual judgment 'this is blue,' which only the sixth, mind consciousness performs. Later, in post-Dignāga epistemology, non-conceptual cognition was reinterpreted as a pre-reflective, self-intimating feature of all cognitive states. This article examines the challenges early Buddhist exegetes faced in explaining immediate, non-conceptual cognition.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Consciousness Cognition Object grammar Epistemology |
| Citations | 12 |
| Key finding | Early Buddhist exegetes struggled to account for immediate, non-conceptual cognition, which was later reconceived in post-Dignāga epistemology as a pre-reflective feature of all cognition. |
Abstract
In post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology, non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpajñāna) comes to be construed as a sort of pre-reflective and self-intimating feature of all states of cognition. In earlier Buddhist Ābhidharmika exegesis, however, the closest candidate for non-conceptual cognition is the notion that the five sense consciousnesses apprehend their object-supports directly, as opposed to the sixth consciousness—mind consciousness (manovij ñāna)—which alone has the capacity for conceptual discrimination. In an oft -repeated example, visual consciousness is said to know "blue" but not "this is blue"; it is mind consciousness that knows "this is blue." This article explores the diffi culties that early Buddhist exegetes encountered as they tried to make sense of immediate, non-conceptual cognition.