The Pleasure of Not Experiencing Anything: Some Reflections on Consciousness in the Context of the Early Buddhist Nikāyas

The pleasure of nibbāna, according to the Nibbānasukha-sutta, lies in experiencing nothing. This paper reconstructs the philosophical background of this counterintuitive claim by re-examining Nikāya passages and drawing on cognitive science and philosophy of mind. It argues that the five khandhas, especially viññāṇa, refer to consciousness with phenomenal, introspectable, reportable content that can be integrated into memory. Such consciousness is not constant; its low frequency in absorption or flow states contributes to their pleasurable nature and altered sense of time and self. The paper hypothesizes that the presence or absence of this consciousness relates to dukkha or sukha, with saṅkhāra playing a key role. It also discusses limits of introspection and non-introspectable pleasure, concluding that early Buddhist transformation involves no longer identifying with one's own consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The Nibbānasukha-sutta contains Sāriputta’s statement that the pleasure (sukha) of nibbāna lies in the fact that nothing is experienced (vedayita). This statement may be seen as complementary to the proclamation in the Kaḷāra-sutta that all that is experienced is unpleasant (dukkha). In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct the ideas serving as a philosophical backdrop to these radical and seemingly counterintuitive claims. I use a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, re-examining several key Nikāya passages, as well as drawing on modern cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I suggest that vedayita and the closely related concept of the five khandhas (and in particular viññāṇa) refer to various aspects of the type of consciousness whose content is phenomenal, introspectable, reportable and may be integrated into memory. I suggest that such consciousness is not a constant feature of our being engaged in the world and that its absence does not entail insentience or being incognizant. I hypothesize that a relatively low frequency of occurrences of such consciousness in the states known as absorption or flow contributes to their pleasurable nature and the altered sense of the passage of time and selfhood. I attempt to explain how the presence or absence of such consciousness is related to the states of dukkha or sukha, with particular focus on the role played by saṅkhāra. I also discuss the limits of introspection as a means of understanding what exactly makes experiences pleasurable or painful, and consider the possibility of non-introspectable forms of pleasure. In conclusion, I suggest that psychological transformation in early Buddhism is connected with a radical change of perspective, which involves no longer identifying with one’s own consciousness.